Introduction
Th e immigration control systems of developed states are today frequently characterised by strategies of 'extraterritorialisation'. Th is has involved the rejection of the model whereby admission decisions are taken at ports and border crossing points, and the policing of irregular migration takes place either at the borders or within the territory. Developed states now increasingly treat that model as anachronistic, and seek instead to take immigration control action -both decisionmaking and enforcement -prior to an individual's arrival on their territory. In some cases, indeed, the objective appears to be that as much immigration control activity as possible should take place elsewhere, either on the territory of other states, or in international waters, where the presumption is that states lack jurisdiction.
Th is chapter provides an overview, from a legal perspective, of extraterritorial practices within contemporary immigration control. It will focus on examples from the United States, the United Kingdom and the European Union, with the experiences of other developed states referred to where appropriate. Th e material is organised into three substantive sections, which discuss visa requirements, predeparture checks and interception at sea, respectively.
Th e chapter's starting-point is Guiraudon's observation that extraterritorialisation strategies aim at "short-circuiting judicial constraints on migration control."
1 Th e chapter will show that the development of extraterritorial immigration control techniques typically refl ects a mixture of non-legal and legal factors. Non-legal factors include passenger convenience, the prevention of irregular migration, security, and the terms of the relationship with specifi c other states. Th e legal element consists in the avoidance of international law and domestic law
Visa requirements
Th e initial sense of the term 'visa' was the endorsement of a travel document by a state offi cial, in order to signify that they had 'seen' the document, in a context where the forms of travel document varied widely. Torpey has shown that general requirements upon travellers to obtain visas in this sense go back to at least the early nineteenth century in Europe. 2 At that time, visa requirements typically applied to all travellers, irrespective of nationality, and applied to travel within countries as well as between them. Gradually, visa requirements came to acquire a second function: no longer mere endorsements, but rather a form of permission which an individual must obtain before arrival at a state's ports of entry. Visa requirements, aimed specifi cally at controlling admission to states arose with the establishment of an inter-state passport system in the late nineteenth century. An early example was Germany's visa requirement upon those arriving from Russia between 1879 and 1894, the purpose of which was to limit migration by ethnic Poles. 3 Another early case was the United States law of 1884 which required returning migrants from China -who were exempt from new Chinese exclusion laws -to have their passports endorsed by US offi cials in the port of departure, in order to confi rm their status. 4 Th e First World War was decisive in the move to more general visa regimes: once introduced, they generally continued after they war, unless modifi ed by reciprocal arrangements.
5 Th e international visa regime was further developed in the 1930s, as a result of refugee fl ows associated with Nazi Germany's policies, particularly after the Anschluss with Austria in March 1938, the annexation of the Sudetenland in October 1938 and the Kristallnacht pogroms of November 1938. Th e events of 1938 led potential destination states to use visa restrictions both to limit numbers and to select those least likely to impose fi nancial costs upon them. Th e result was that, by early 1939, among possible destinations, only the open city of Shanghai did not require a visa. 6 In the postwar era, visa requirements have been commonplace within immigration control regimes. In order to understand contemporary visa systems, this section contains a discussion of the position in the United States, United Kingdom and (more briefl y) the European Union.
United States
Th e United States fi rst introduced a visa requirement in July 1917, soon after its entry into World War I. 7 A legislative basis for this requirement was given by an Act of May 1918 concerning entry and exit from its territory, 8 and a visa requirement was retained after the war came to an end.
9 Th e next major development was the introduction of a generalised visa regime for intending permanent migrants (known as 'immigrants' in the United States system) by the Immigration Act of 1924.
10 Th e background was that national origins quotas had been introduced for permanent immigration by legislation in 1921, but proved unworkable without a system of entry permits, since passengers risked being refused entry upon arrival once the corresponding quota was exhausted. Accordingly, the 1924 legislation made the possession of a valid visa a precondition to admission for all permanent immigrants.
11 Its eff ect was that negative decisions -because a quota had been reached, or for other reasons, such as an individual's medical condition or that they were thought "likely to become a public charge" -took place mainly at points of departure rather than points of arrival. Temporary visitors ('non-immigrants') meanwhile remained subject to the rules deriving from the 1918 Act. 12 Th e principle that all non-citizens require a visa in order to be admitted to the territory is now refl ected in the Immigration and Nationality Act 1952. 13 Th ere are exceptions for journeys from certain adjacent territories -including Canada and Bermuda, but not Mexico -by nationals of those territories.
14 Since the Immigration Reform and Control Act 1986, the United States has also had a 'visa waiver program' (VWP), which permits individuals to stay in the United States for up to 90 days for tourist or business purposes. At the time of writing, 35 countries are covered by the VWP, including 22 EU member states. 15 Th e most recent reform of the US visa system is that, since 12 January 2009, the 'Electronic System for Travel Authorisation' (ESTA) has been added to the VWP. 16 Under ESTA, intending VWP travellers must obtain advance electronic approval for travel to the United States. Passenger details are checked against terrorist and criminal watch lists, information on lost and stolen passports, and information on previous visa revocations. If approval is refused, the individual is required to apply for a visa, despite their VWP nationality. While no sanction is specifi ed for not obtaining ESTA approval, an individual without it will presumably be denied boarding by a carrier, and would anyway face a refusal of admission should they succeed in reaching a United States port of entry.
Th e mixture of immigration and security factors shaping the visa regime can be seen in the strict conditions for states' eligibility for the VWP. 17 Th ese include a low rate of refusal of temporary visas to nationals (less than 3% in the previous year), that participating states report both lost and stolen passports to the United States or Interpol, and that they share intelligence on individuals who might be a threat to the US. 18 Paradoxically, the existence of the VWP is thought to enhance security, because it gives the United States leverage over the forms of document issued by participating states. Since 27 October 2005, VWP nationals have had to present machine-readable passports, while participating states have been required to issue passports with biometric identifi ers. In practice, irregular migration concerns are often decisive in the loss of VWP status, as when the fear of overstaying led to its withdrawal from Argentina (2001) and Uruguay (2003), after economic crises in those countries.
While the US visa system was initially developed for practical reasons, at a time of long-distance sea travel, legal factors have also been signifi cant throughout its history. Th is is because, since the 1920s, US courts have taken the view that consular decisions to refuse visas are not reviewable by the courts. 19 Th ey have done so both out of deference to the Congressional prerogative power over immigration, and because of a statement in the Immi gration and Nationality Act precluding the Secretary of State from super vision of consular decisions over visas.
20 Th e one exception is that judicial review is possible where a visa refusal aff ects constitutional rights, such as freedom of expression 21 or the rights concerning family life. 22 By contrast, where a foreign national is refused admission at a United States port of entry, the default position is that they are entitled to review of any removal by an immigration judge. 23 One exception is that, where a refusal of admission is due to the non-possession of required documents, or document fraud, removal without appeal is permitted ('expedited removal'). 24 A second exception is that entry under the VWP is conditional upon the individual's waiving any legal claims against a decision of inadmissibility or removal. 25 Even in these two cases, however, it remains possible to claim asylum within a removal procedure. 23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41 In the period up to the mid-1980s, changes to visa requirements were mainly driven by international political concerns: Cuba, the German Democratic Republic (both added in 1972) Pakistan (1973) and Argentina (1982) became visa states, while Yugoslavia (removed in 1970), Bahrain, Qatar (both 1972), Niger (1974) and the United Arab Emirates (1978) ceased to be so. 30 Th ere was then a marked expansion of visa requirements between 1985 and 1995, with fi fteen states added to the list. 31 A further sixteen states were added in 1996, largely as a result of EU legislation, of which only three were removed when the EU rules ceased to apply to the United Kingdom in 2001.
32 Perhaps because the pool 1   2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22   23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43   33 Th ese From 1985 to 2003, when the United Kingdom acted unilaterally, its decision to introduce visa requirements for particular countries was often a means to forestall asylum applications. Th is was seen initially with Sri Lanka in 1985, when the Government was explicit that the measure was a response to an existing fl ow of Tamil asylum applicants.
34 Th e introduction of visa requirements after a signifi cant rise in asylum applications would later be seen in the cases of Turkey in 1989, Yugoslavia in 1992, Colombia in 1997, the Slovak Republic in 1998 and (among other factors) Zimbabwe in 2002. 35 Avoidance of asylum applications was not always a central factor, however. For example, the justifi cation given for the introduction in 1986 of visas for Bangladesh and India, and for visitors from Pakistan, was that this would enable arrivals from those countries to be managed, while giving security to travellers that they would be admitted upon arrival. 36 In the cases of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia in 1990, the then non-binding coordination of visa requirements among EU member states was given as the explanation. 37 In 2003, the reason given for the introduction of a visa requirement for Jamaican nationals was that this would reduce overstaying. applied, irregular migration risks featured prominently, defi ned as a "low incidence of identifi ed immigration abuse, including denial of visas for entry to the UK owing to presentation of false documents, overstaying, illegal working and clandestine entry". Other criteria included the security of the state's passports; reporting of lost or stolen passports; co-operation in the repatriation and redocumentation of nationals; a low risk of terrorism and criminality; and, the economic impact of a visa requirement. Th is new approach was clearly infl uenced by the system in the United States, discussed above, not least in that the language of 'waiver' treats visa requirements as the norm, and exceptions as requiring of justifi cation. Th e test eventually led to visa requirements being imposed on Bolivia, Lesotho, South Africa, Swaziland and Venezuela in 2009, and to the partial ending of the general visa requirement for Taiwan.
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At the time of writing, the result of the gradual expansion of UK visa requirements is that the nationals of 109 states and similar entities are covered, while 53 UN member states outside the EEA are visa-exempt. 41 In addition, in recent years, the United Kingdom has expanded the range of migrants from visa-exempt states, who must obtain prior entry clearance.
42 Th e current position is that a non-EEA national whose intended stay is for more than six months requires entry clearance in all cases. Even if the individual's stay is for less than six months, entry clearance is also required for many specifi c categories, including all of those coming to engage in economic activity. It is clear that the current British strategy is to expand entry clearance as far as possible. As a 2007 Home Offi ce policy document on immigration control put it: "off -shoring our border control is the keystone of our border defence." 43 Th e framework governing legal challenges to adverse immigration decisions is crucial to the strategy of maximising the reach of entry clearance. Firstly, those who are refused entry clearance may lack an eff ective legal remedy. While a refusal of entry clearance has in principle been covered by the immigration appeal system ever since the Immigration Act 1971, the reach of this entitlement has subsequently been narrowed. 44 An Act of 1993 removed rights of appeal where (1) the applicant was an intending visitor, short-term student, prospective student, or dependants of these, or (2) the reason for the refusal of entry clearance was that the individual did not possess a 'relevant document' (e.g. passport, identity document or work permit), or did not meet specifi ed requirements as to age, nationality or period of intended stay. 45 Th e eff ect of those changes was only partly off set by legislation in 1999 which restored a right of appeal for family visitors. 46 A second curtailment of appeal rights came in 2008, with the removal of appeals concerning the points-based system -that is, by economic migrants, students and their dependants. 47 As Clayton points out in her chapter in this collection, the result is that overseas appeal rights are eff ectively limited to family cases.
A second legal point is that only those who reach the United Kingdomwhether because they are not subject to entry clearance requirements, or because they reach the UK in spite of them -have the possibility to claim international protection, under the Geneva Convention and/or the ECHR. An equivalent possibility is not open to those refused entry clearance. Within United Kingdom legislation, this result is achieved by section 95 of the Nationality Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, which does not allow an appeal based on a claim for international protection by a person who is outside the territory.
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Th irdly, there are doubts as to the extent to which fundamental rights arguments may be made to challenge United Kingdom entry clearance refusals. Following the incorporation of the ECHR into United Kingdom law by the Human Rights Act 1998, the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 introduced a general right to appeal all negative immigration decisions on ECHR grounds. However, in its decision in Moon in 2005, the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal held that the ECHR does not cover entry clearance refusals, other than those concerning the guarantee of family life in its Article 8. 49 Th is outcome may be contrasted not just with that in the United States, but also with the German and Belgian case law concerning the Unifi cation Church discussed in Evelien Brouwer's contribution to this collection. It remains possible for those lacking appeal rights to bring judicial review claims to the High Court. Judicial review action taken by immigration applicants outside the territory should not be thought impossible. Th is is illustrated by the Farrakhan decision in 2002, where the applicant unsuccessfully challenged an exclusion order, and by the Yousaf decision in 2009, in which the applicant unsuccessfully challenged the non-issue of a work permission. 50 Nevertheless, potential applicants are likely to be deterred in most cases by the potential costs of unsuccessful judicial review proceedings, and will generally prefer to make a fresh visa application.
European Union
European Union policy on short-stay visas (up to three months) concerns the 28 Schengen states -that is, the 25 EU member states other than Britain and Ireland, and Iceland, Norway and Switzerland. 51 Under this policy, at the time of writing, there are 131 states and other entities on the so-called 'negative list' of states whose nationals require a visa.
52 Th e corresponding 'positive list' has 36 states or other entities with respect to which participating states may not apply short-stay visas.
Because of its link to the Schengen border-free zone, the content of the EU's visa list policy has generally been shaped by the preferences of the participating states. 53 It is clear however that the avoidance of irregular migration is at the heart of the policy. Th at was seen for example in the June 2002 call by the European Council for a review of the visa lists, as part of the EU strategy in relation to "illegal immigration". 54 Th at review led to addition of Ecuador to the negative list, for reasons "based primarily on considerations relating to illegal immigration". 9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24   25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41 states are likely to be moved to the positive list when there is thought to be a low risk of irregular migration, and reciprocity in visa-free travel can be agreed with them. In particular, that was the reason for the transfer of six Commonwealth states from the negative to the positive lists during 2009, after the signature of agreements on reciprocity in visa waivers between them and the EU. 57 An important diff erence between the EU system and those of the United States and United Kingdom is that rights of appeal against visa refusals are recognised. In relation to long-term visas (over three months), a right of legal challenge is provided for in Directives on the admission of family members, students, researchers and highly qualifi ed employees. 58 More recently, the Visas Code, adopted in July 2009, provides that those refused short-term visas (up to three months) shall have an entitlement both to know the reasons, and to an appeal "conducted in accordance with … national law."
59 Th ese provisions are stronger than the previous position, under the Common Consular Instructions, which left participating states with competence over both reasons and appeals.
60 Th e greater provision for avenues of legal challenge within the EU suggests that legal considerations play less of a role within its visa policy. Legal factors are still signifi cant, however, given that visa refusals frustrate the possibility to apply for asylum, and that rights of legal challenge are likely to be harder to exercise from abroad. With respect to the latter, it is revealing that, in the drafting of the Visas Code, the Council of Ministers removed a clause from the Commission proposal which would have required a notice of refusal of a visa to include information concerning legal representation. 61 Th is outcome may be contrasted with the requirement to provide that information in the equivalent provision of the Schengen Borders Code, for those refused entry at the external borders of the Schengen zone. 62 
Pre-embarkation controls
A second way for a state to 'extraterritorialise' its immigration policy is for it to send its immigration or border offi cials outwards, in order to encounter travellers before they arrive on the state's territory. Strategies of this kind come in diff erent forms: the summary here distinguishes between formal pre-clearance schemes, where an immigration decision is taken prior to embarkation, and informal decision-making through advice given to carriers.
United States preclearance
Th e United States is the state with the greatest experience of formal pre-clearance arrangements. Its preclearance operations began with Canada, with the introduction of ad hoc controls at Toronto airport in 1952. 63 Th ese controls were later formalised through the Air Transport Preclearance Agreement of 1974 between the two countries. 64 Increasing concern for the legal position of individuals led to a legal basis in Canadian law being provided by the Preclearance Act 1999, and to a second international agreement in January 2001. 65 Under these arrangements, US controls on both persons and goods operate at eight Canadian airports.
66 Th e Canadian government's assessment is that the advantages of preclearance are its "great convenience to the travelling public," because it permits fl ights to all airport terminals in the United States, and not just airports or terminals designated as 'international'. Under the international agreement, Canada has the option to operate immigration controls at US departure points, but has not chosen to do so -presumably because there are far fewer advantages in opening other Canadian airports to direct travel to the United States.
1 Th e United States has also entered international agreements with respect to Bermuda, the Bahamas (both in 1974) and Aruba (1987 and 1994) , which permit both immigration checks and controls on goods. 67 As with Canada, the main purpose of these agreements appears to be to facilitate travel, by permitting fl ights to all destinations in the United States. In the case of Bermuda, a further agreement in 2009 will, when implemented, extend pre-clearance to private aircraft. 68 In addition, the United States conducts immigration controls at airports in Ireland. Th is system, known as 'pre-inspection', began in Shannon in 1986 (initially as a pilot) and was extended to Dublin in 1994 when direct fl ights commenced from there to the United States.
69 Because pre-inspection at the Irish airports has hitherto involved immigration controls alone, it has not so far been implied the possibility of landing at domestic United States airports or terminals. Th is will presumably change with the implementation of a second agreement, concluded between the United States and Ireland in November 2008, which provides for full pre-clearance, including inspections of goods, and for the application of controls to private aircraft. 70 In the absence of fl ights to domestic airports and terminals, the main purpose of these arrangements has probably been to allow the United States to refuse admission to travellers from Ireland. A further factor, which has been relied upon by the Irish government in order to justify these arrangements, is that United States immigration controls encourage reliance upon Shannon by transatlantic traffi c. 71 It is unlikely to be coincidental that the United States has a strategic interest in Shannon's commercial viability, as it uses the airport for stopovers by military aircraft.
While the United States preclearance arrangements -the Irish case aparthave mainly been adopted for reasons of traveller convenience, there is an immigration law dimension as well. Under US immigration law, a decision taken within preinspection has "the same eff ect … as though made at the destined port-of-entry in the United States."
72 Despite that, a person prevented from travelling to the United States under these arrangements will be unable to access the legal procedure which would have been applicable had they been refused entry at a port of entry (see section 1, above). Th at is because immigration judges rule on an individual's admissibility or asylum claim only within a removal procedure, and do not have jurisdiction over a pre-embarkation refusal.
Juxtaposed controls
A parallel case of formal pre-embarkation immigration decisions is provided by the 'juxtaposed controls' in operation on certain journeys between the United Kingdom on the one hand and France and Belgium on the other. 73 (Th ese arrangements are analysed in detail in Gina Clayton's contribution to this volume.) Juxtaposed controls began in 1994, with the application of all categories of border control to persons travelling through the channel tunnel, pursuant to an international agreement between France and the United Kingdom. tunnel controls: once security checks are made on vehicles prior to entry into the tunnel, it reduces delay if immigration and other frontier controls also take place at that stage. While subsequent developments at Eurostar stations and ferry ports can be rationalised in similar terms, in fact these were mainly introduced in order to frustrate irregular migration to the United Kingdom, and the making of asylum claims there. Th e background to the Eurostar juxtaposed controls was the increase in undocumented arrivals and persons claiming asylum at the terminus in London (then Waterloo). 78 Equally, the extension of immigration controls to the ferry ports was intended to address irregular migration pressures around Calais, and was decided upon by the two governments in 2002 at the same time as the French government agreed to close the Red Cross humanitarian camp for migrants at nearby Sangatte.
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Th is immigration control objective has been furthered by three aspects of the international arrangements. Firstly, the agreements concerning the channel tunnel and ferry ports include provision for a 'control zone' within which offi cials the state of destination are allowed to operate.
80 Th e United Kingdom border authorities use their 'control zones' in order to conduct X-ray, carbon dioxide and other checks, in order to detect migrants concealing themselves on trucks bound for the United Kingdom. Secondly, the agreements between France and the United Kingdom concerning the Eurostar and ferry ports provide that asylum claims are the responsibility of the state of departure, until the closure of the train doors or the departure of the vessel. 81 Th irdly, all of the arrangements referred to provide that a person refused access to the destination territory is the responsibility of the state of departure.
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Th e limited avenues for legal challenges are again central to understanding the success of juxtaposed controls. United Kingdom law was modifi ed in 2000 to make clear that immigration offi cers who are outside the territory may examine passengers, including by giving or refusing leave to enter, and may cancel leave to enter deriving from entry clearance. 83 It is not clear however that the same extension applies to rights of appeal. Claims of international protection are undoubtedly blocked by section 95 of the Nationality Immi gration and Asylum Act 2002 Act (referred to in the previous section), which precludes appeals on this ground by persons outside the United Kingdom. In other cases, the approach of the immigration authorities appears to be to allow appeals on the same basis as if the individual had been refused entry at a United Kingdom port. 84 A potential problem for that approach is the legislative provision whereby refusal of leave to enter gives rise to a right of appeal only if, "on … arrival in the United Kingdom," the individual had entry clearance. 85 It is arguable on logical grounds that the reference to "arrival in the United Kingdom" excludes a right of appeal in all cases where leave to enter is refused -including by the cancellation of leave 86 -before the individual has reached the United Kingdom. If that was the intention behind this phrase, however, this was not communicated to Parliament when the phrase was inserted into the legislation as part of the amendment of rights of appeal in 2006. Th en, the Government focused on the removal of rights of appeal from all those without entry clearance (the point discussed in the previous section), and did not refer a further exclusion of rights of appeal for persons with entry clearance, but prevented from embarking at a juxtaposed control.
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It may be added that any general exclusion of rights of appeal is inapplicable to EEA nationals and their family members, as a refusal to admit them at a juxtaposed control is presumably an example of an "EEA decision" which they may challenge.
88 For non-EEA cases, it also remains possible to claim either race discrimination or a breach of the ECHR. 89 As we have seen, however, there are doubts in the United Kingdom as to the extraterritorial applicability of the ECHR in non-family cases.
A fi nal point concerns the position where persons are refused entry to France at the reciprocal juxtaposed controls operating at departure points in the United Kingdom. Th is is governed by the Schengen Borders Code, which sets out the general principle that a person who is refused entry at a Schengen border is entitled both to "a substantiated decision stating the precise reasons for the refusal" and to an appeal "in accordance with national law." 90 Th e Code includes specifi c provisions permitting pre-departure checks upon travellers on high-speed trains and ships, based on international agreements between the states concerned.
91 It may be inferred from these references within the Code that the general principle of a right of appeal also applies to immigration refusals taken prior to departure.
Co-operation with carriers
Legal obligations upon the carriers of passengers who are not admitted to a state have a long history. In the nineteenth century, US states and cities with seaports often obliged carriers to post bonds for migrants considered likely to become a public charge. 92 Perhaps the fi rst example of a carriers' obligation linked to systematic immigration control was Australia's Immigration Restric tion Act 1901. Refl ecting the 'white Australia' policy of the newly formed state, the 1901 Act imposed a penalty on carriers who brought non-European passengers to Australia who were not admitted -usually, because they failed a literacy test designed to exclude them. 93 A further development was the linking of carriers' obligations to the lack of a visa, which appears to have fi rst been done by the United States' Passenger Act 1924.
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Carriers' penalties for bringing inadequately documented passengers are now common. For example, Australia's Migration Act includes an off ence to bring a non-citizen to the country without a visa. 95 sanctions also came to be required at the international level. In particular, the 1990 UN Migrant Smuggling Protocol -to which there are 150 parties at the time of writing -requires states to oblige "commercial carriers … to ascertain that all passengers are in possession of the travel documents required for entry into the receiving State." 98 In addition, since 1997, Schengen rules have obliged participating states to impose penalties upon the carriers of inadequately documented non-EU nationals. 99 Other contemporary legal provisions require carriers to bear the costs of the detention and/ or removal of passengers who are not admitted under immigration laws. For example, in the United Kingdom, the Immigration Act 1971 permits an immigration offi cer to direct a carrier to remove a person they have brought to a port and who has been refused entry. 100 Similarly, the Schengen rules on carriers oblige member states to require carriers to return inadequately documented passengers.
For our purposes, the signifi cance of carriers' penalties and other obligations is that they provide an incentive for carriers to co-operate with immigration offi cials. One form of co-operation is known as 'carrier liaison', and involves the stationing of immigration offi cials at embarkation points in order to give advice to carriers, particularly in relation to the adequacy and genuineness of passenger documents. Carriers' liaison schemes were generally set up in the decade after the mid-1980s, as visa requirements and carriers' sanctions expanded. For example, Australia and Canada began liaison operations in 1989, New Zealand did so in 1991, the United Kingdom in 1993 and the Netherlands in 1994. 101 In the case of the United States, a limited 'carrier consultant program' was in place in 1994, aimed at training airline staff and government overseas government offi cials in the review of passenger documents. 102 'immigration advisory program', which aims to prevent the travel of those with inadequate documents or who pose a security threat.
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A second form of co-operation between carriers and immigration authorities is preferential schemes, through which carriers' either avoid lia bility or benefi t from reduced sanctions, if they comply with specifi ed pro cedures. For example, Britain has had an 'approved gate check' system since 1992, in order to protect carriers against passengers disposing of their documents after embarkation. 104 Canada has a system whereby a 'memorandum of understanding' between an airline and the Canadian Border Services Agency can lead to a full or partial reduction in the amount of an administrative fi ne for persons not admitted. 105 In the case of the Netherlands, the introduction of carriers' sanctions led to a 'memorandum of understanding' between the immigration authorities and KLM, the main international carrier, which came into force in April 2000. Under that agreement, in return for the KLM agreeing to implement checks on every passenger, to train its staff , and to follow immigration offi cials' advice in all cases, it was agreed that it would not be prosecuted for inadequately documented passengers, up to a defi ned annual quota. Th e expansion of carriers' obligations from the mid-1980s, and the related development of co-operation between carriers and immigration authorities, have often been designed to uphold visa requirements, and therefore to prevent irregular migration and to frustrate potential asylum applications.
111 From a legal perspective, the consequence of these developments is that the eff ective decision to prevent travel is no longer taken by immigration offi cials, but rather by the carriers themselves. Th e consequence of this 'privatisation' is to further distance states from the prospect of legal action based on an individual's entitlement to travel and from claims to international protection. Th ere is little or no prospect of a successful legal action against the carrier either, as is illustrated by unsuccessful litigation in the United Kingdom concerning alleged breach of EU free movement of persons principles and race discrimination. 112 Equally, it may be thought relatively unlikely that carriers will allow someone to travel who is inadequately documented, in order that they may make an asylum claim upon arrival, notwithstanding that carriers' penalty regimes often contain an exception for passengers who succeed in such claims. 
Interdiction at sea
A third form of extraterritorial immigration control is the interdiction of vessels at sea -that is, action taken by states to prevent sea-borne migrants from reaching their intended destination. Th is kind of enforcement activity diff ers from that discussed in previous sections, in that it is concerned with migration by irregular channels, rather than with passengers seeking to travel by 'regular' routes. As a consequence, the primary role of offi cials from the state of destination is not to take a decision on whether the individual should be admitted to the state's territory. Rather, the destination state's primary objective is to prevent migrants from reaching the state's territory by irregular means. 9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26   27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42 Probably the fi rst case of systematic enforcement action at sea against irregular migration was that taken by Britain against unauthorised Jewish arrivals to Palestine in the late 1930s and between 1945 and 1948. 114 Th ese British measures included the deployment of its navy, fi rst between July and September 1939, and then from October 1945. 115 Th e main objective of these controls was not interdiction, but interception -that is, the identifi cation of vessels, with a view to the arrest of vessels and their passengers once they entered territorial waters. Th e practical result of these interceptions for most passengers was deportation, principally to Cyprus in the postwar phase. Operations in international waters were constrained by Britain's position as a leading maritime power, which led it to defend the freedom of the high seas. For example, in 1946, the British government rejected a proposal from its admiralty to permit searches and arrests in international waters where vessels lacked an identifi able master or a recognised fl ag. Th e offi cial policy remained that police action in international waters required either a state of war or treaty authorisation by the fl ag state. 116 A second leading case of immigration enforcement at sea concerned the Vietnamese 'boat people' who attempted to reach neighbouring countries at various periods between 1975 and 1992. 117 In this case, forms of interdiction were practiced by destination states, through refusals to allow vessels to land, and through 'push backs' of boats to international waters. Singapore adopted an especially restrictive policy towards boat arrivals from Vietnam, and refused to allow migrants' vessels to land as early as May 1975. 118 Malaysia and Th ailand also engaged in policies of taking boats out to international waters, particularly in 1978-1979 and 1988-1989 . 119 Th ese latter measures were among the main reasons for the conclusion of international arrangements for the Vietnamese and 1989, based on processing in the region, and resettlement in western countries for those accepted as refugees. Th e responses to Jewish migration to Palestine and to the Vietnamese boat people had in common that the destination states were not taken to be covered by obligations of non-refoulement. Th e remainder of this section will consider more recent cases of interdiction strategies where the avoidance or minimisation of responsibility under international refugee law has been part of states' motivations: US interdiction policies since 1981, Australia's interdiction policies between 2001 and 2007, and ongoing enforcement action led by Italy and Spain aimed at migration from Africa.
United States interdiction
United States interdiction policies -discussed in detail in Niels Frenzen's contribution to this volume -have been in eff ect since 1981, and have mainly concerned persons making irregular journeys from Caribbean countries. Th ese began as a belated reaction to the 'Mariel boatlift' from Cuba in the summer of 1980, when an estimated 124,776 persons reached the Florida coast.
120 Th e Mariel boatlift was followed by a decision to curtail immigration by Haitians, with respect to whom there were not the same political reasons to allow admission. In September 1981, after an agreement with Haiti, which allowed the United States to interdict vessels departing from its territory, President Reagan issued a executive order authorising interdiction in order to prevent "the entry of undocumented aliens from the high seas". 121 In October, the Coast Guard began patrolling the Windward Passage, to the west of Haiti and to the east of Cuba.
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Interdiction operations have continued against irregular migration by Haitians since 1981. Interdiction has also been practiced in the Straits of Florida since an attempted re-run of the Mariel boatlift in August 1994. 123 A third strand is the interdiction of those seeking to travel through the Mona Passage from the Dominican Republic to Puerto Rico, which began in April 1995. 124 125 Th e Coast Guard has also engaged in immigration control on vessels travelling from China, particularly to Guam, and interdicted 5,912 Chinese nationals over the same period. 126 In addition, since 1999, a total of 8,257 Ecuadorian nationals have been interdicted on immigration grounds, presumably primarily in the Pacifi c.
127
One legal question posed by United States interdiction on the high seas is whether it has a basis in international law. Th e 1981 executive order, and its successor in February 1992, expressly limited interdiction to vessels without nationality, or with whose fl ag state there were "arrangements" authorising interdiction.
128
In the case of Haiti, the agreement of September 1981 allowed the detention and return of Haitian fl ag vessels and their passengers, where the US authorities determined after a preliminary visit that "an off ense against United States immigration laws … has been or is being committed." Th at international agreement was however terminated by the Aristide government in 1994, after the US suspended its bar on the return of refugees between 1992 and 1994. 129 In the case of Cuba, permission for interdiction arguably comes from a joint statement between the two governments in May 1995 on the "normalization of migration". Th is text provided that "eff ective immediately, Cuban migrants intercepted at sea by the United States and attempting to enter the United States will be taken to Cuba." 130 In the case of the Dominican Republic, a May 2003 agreement gives general permission to United States vessels to board Dominican vessels on the high seas which are suspected of engaging in migrant smuggling, and to return those on board to the Dominican Republic. 131 For countries other than Cuba and the Dominican Republic, if there is a current legal basis for interdiction, it must either lie in individual authorisations, or derive from lawful Specifi c provision for refugees has to date been made in two internation al agreements permitting the interdiction of migrants. Th e September 1981 agreement with Haiti included the statement that "under these arrangements the United States Government does not intend to return to Haiti any Haitian migrants whom the United States authorities determine to qualify for refugee status." Similarly, the 2003 agreement with the Dominican Republic provides that there should not be involuntary return of a person who has "a well-founded fear of persecution" on Geneva Convention grounds, or "there are substantial grounds for believing that the person would be in danger of being subjected to torture." 133 In addition, irrespective of specifi c international agreements, US practice has generally been to allow those interdicted in the Caribbean to make known their desire for protection. It appears that those interdicted on their way from Cuba or China have been informed of this possibility automatically, whereas those arriving from elsewhere have been required to spontaneously indicate a desire for protection when taken on board Coast Guard vessels (the 'shout test'). 134 Since 1994, individuals who indicate a protection need have generally been transferred to immigration detention at Guantánamo Bay for an assessment of their case. 135 If successful, they have been resettled somewhere other than the United States. 136 In practice, however, success rates have been very low. For example, between May 1995 and July 2003, only 170 Cuban refugees were resettled from Guantánamo Bay. 137 Equally, between February and July 2004 -at a time when an armed rebellion in Haiti had forced its president to leave the country -of 2830 Haitians interdicted, only 35 cases were examined, and only six persons were recognised as refugees. Th e practical limitations to extraterritorial processing are signifi cant in part because a feature of United States approach is that the Coast Guard is permitted to interdict even within United States territorial waters. Th e reason for allowing this form of interdiction is that, under the so-called 'wet foot/ dry foot' theory, it is only upon reaching shore that the protections of the Immigration and Nationality Act 1952 apply.
139 Th e diffi culty is that international law guarantees against non-refoulement must be taken to apply at least within territorial waters. Where interdiction occurs within territorial waters, the justifi cation for United States policy must be that the system of extraterritorial processing on its own is suffi cient to meet non-refoulement obligations. Th e evidence for that must be considered weak, however.
In one period -May 1992 to May 1994 -the United States openly returned migrants to Haiti, after interdiction on the high seas, without permitting a claim for protection. Th is was in response to a large outfl ow and the exhaustion of the available detention space at Guantánamo Bay. It was this phase of its interdiction policy which led to the Supreme Court's decision in Sale in 1993, in which it held that neither the Immigration and Nationality Act 1952 nor Article 33 of the Geneva Convention constrained return from international waters. 140 In relation to Article 33, the Supreme Court's conclusion, based on an analysis of its language and of the negotiating history, was that the phrase "No Contracting State shall … return ('refouler')" only covered someone's who was being turned away from the state's territory.
While the motivation for the United States interdiction programme has been the prevention of irregular migration, that objective has throughout had a signifi cant legal component. In the period prior to the decision to introduce interdiction in 1981, the US immigration authorities had faced successful legal challenges to attempts both at mass refusals of asylum to Haitians, and at their mass expulsion. 141 Th at litigation led directly to the proposal for interdiction in the July 1981 report of a presidential task force on immigration and asylum. According to the report:
Th e purpose of an interdiction program would be both to deter directly further unlawful migration by expeditiously returning migrants to Haiti, and incidentally, to curtail the fl ow of aliens into administrative and judicial proceedings in the United States. Although required by the UN Protocol and Convention to adjudicate refugee claims prior to returning a claimant to his homeland, if interdiction occurs outside of US territorial waters, the determination would not be governed by the Immigration Act.
142
Interdiction continues to remain preferable from the authorities' perspective. While the mechanism of 'expedited removal' (discussed above) was extended in 2002 to those arriving irregularly by sea, it remains subject to the possibility to claim asylum. 143 In addition, those who have reached the United States are likely to fi nd it easier to indicate a protection need -and thereby to start the processthan those who have been interdicted. Moreover those who succeed in an asylum claim will be able to stay in the United States, whereas those who succeed extraterritorially are likely to be resettled in another country.
Australia's 'Pacifi c solution'
United States policies of interdiction and extraterritorial processing have provided a model for other states in framing a response to irregular migration by sea. Th is was most obviously true of Australia in the period of the Howard Government's 'Pacifi c solution' from 2001 to 2007 -a story discussed in detail by Susan Kneebone in this collection.
144 Th e 'Pacifi c solution' mainly concerned vessels arriving from Indonesia, and typically involved migrants with plausible claims to protection as refugees, and who mainly came from Afghanistan, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. Th e strategy began with a much-discussed incident in August-September 2001: when the Tampa, a Norwegian commercial vessel, entered Australian waters in order to disembark 433 Afghan migrants -which it had previously rescued -at Christmas Island, it was boarded by Australian troops, who ultimately transferred the migrants to a naval vessel, which took them for processing in Nauru.
1 Th e core of the 'Pacifi c solution' approach was extraterritorial processing in Nauru and on Manus Island in Papua New Guinea. Protection claims by these persons were at fi rst assessed by the UNHCR, and then by the Australian authorities. 146 Crucially, however, these procedures did not include any avenue of legal challenge before an Australian tribunal or court.
147 By mid-2006, 1547 persons had been processed in the two locations, of whom 482 had returned to their countries of nationality and 1062 had been resettled -"mainly" to Australia and New Zealand. 148 In 2007, a further 90 persons were transferred to Nauru, of whom 81 were found to be entitled to protection, and were allowed to settle in Australia by the new Rudd Government in December 2007.
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Th e 'Pacifi c solution' was brought to an end by the Rudd Government soon after it came to power in November 2007. Th e new government's decision to do so was motivated in part by the transport and detention costs associated with processing in Nauru and Papua New Guinea. 150 Since early 2008, those interdicted at sea, or who reach an excised island, have instead been taken for 'offshore' processing on Christmas Island.
151 Access has been given to lawyers and interpreters, and there is the prospect of settlement in Australia if an applicant is successful. Nevertheless, the fact that Christmas Island is 'excised' from the migration zone means that their claims continue to be assessed outside of the standard legal mechanisms governing asylum claims.
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Interdiction at sea has been central to Australia's control policy throughout the entire period since the Tampa incident in 2001. Th e legal basis for interdiction is to be found in legislation adopted in 1999 in response to unauthorised boat arrivals that year.
153 Th e 1999 legislation sought to make maximum use of the possibilities given by international law for interdiction outside of territorial waters. 154 In particular, it permitted the boarding of foreign vessels in Australia's contiguous zone, and of vessels without nationality on the high seas, and allowed the 'hot pursuit' of a vessel which left the contiguous zone for the high seas. In practice, interdiction within territorial waters and the contiguous zone was the preferred option in interdiction operations after the Tampa incident in  2001. 155 By contrast, the subsequent approach -against the background a policy of processing on Christmas Island -has included greater willingness to engage in operations beyond the 24-mile limit.
156
During the period immediately after the Tampa incident, the Australian authorities also sought to tow vessels and their passengers back to Indonesia. Th e statutory basis for these 'tow backs' was in legislative amendments adopted at that time, which allowed persons on board detained vessels to be taken "to a place outside Australia."
157 Four of the 12 vessels detected after the Tampa during 2001 in or near Australian waters were successfully towed back, and there was one unsuccessful attempt.
158 Th ere was also at least one subsequent 'tow back' -involving the Minasa Bone -in November 2003.
159 Tow-backs were also threatened in April 2006, after a group of migrants arrived from the Indonesian territory of West Papua successfully claimed asylum.
160
Australia's 'Pacifi c solution' again shows how the desire to avoid international and domestic legal guarantees can lead to extraterritorial immigration control practices. Th e occasional tow-backs to Indonesia were plainly motivated by the desire to avoid any legal responsibility for asylum seekers and recognised refugees. More importantly, Australia's introduction of extraterritorial processing was designed to avoid rights of access to domestic courts. Much as with the United States policies, the Australian strategy between 2001 and 2007 implied a restrictive interpretation of international law obligations -that it permitted individuals to be taken from inside the territory or territorial waters to a site of extraterritorial processing, and that limited procedural guarantees were possible while there.
European interdictions
A fi nal set of interdictions at sea to consider are those aimed at migrants seeking to reach two of the Southern member states of the European Union -Italy and Spain.
161 Th e fi rst systematic attempts at immigration control at sea in Europe were Italian interdiction operations from 1997, in response to the arrival of an estimated 30,000 migrants by sea from Albania in January-April that year.
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Albania's authorisation for the interdiction and return of these vessels was given an agreement in March 1997 between the two states. In practice, interception occurred in both international and Italian waters, while the Albanian authorities co-operated through disruption activity aimed at preventing boats from departing. 163 Even after 1997, signifi cant numbers of arrivals from Albania continued to be detected in Puglia: more than 106,000 in the fi ve years 1998-2002, with a peak of 46,481 in 1999. 164 Th ese migration fl ows largely came to an end by 2002, ultimately because of an improvement of economic and social conditions in Albania, itself linked to Italian support for Albanian development. 165 Th e second zone of large-scale sea migration to Italy has been from North Africa towards Lampedusa and Sicily. In the early 1990s, these arrivals were made up of North Africans departing from Tunisia, but that fl ow ceased around 1998 as a result of disruption activity in Tunisia, against a background of co-operation between the two states. 166 From 2002, larger numbers, mainly from sub- Saharan 1   2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24   25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42 African countries, began to arrive on the longer sea route from Libya. 167 In total, 141,245 migrants were recorded as arriving by sea in Lampedusa or Sicily between 2002 and 2008, with a peak of 34,600 in 2008. 168 Until early 2009, the Italian coastal authorities generally permitted migrants to land, and processed any resulting asylum claims, prior to attempts at repatriation. 169 Th is approach was however the subject of a dramatic change on 6 May 2009, as the Italian coastal authorities began intercepting migrants in international waters off Lampedusa, taking them on board, and returning them to Libya. 170 By August 2009, it was reported that around 14 such operations had taken place, involving around 800 migrants. 171 Th e background to these developments was an agreement reached between Italy and Libya in December 2007 which provided for "joint patrols" off Libya, and for the provision of up to six vessels by Italy to the Libyan coast guard.
172 Th e 2007 agreement did not, however, expressly provide for the return of those who were closer to Italian territory than to Libya, and neither did it appear to contemplate return by Italian-only operations. Th ese possibilities appear instead to be based on an unpublished "implementation protocol", agreed when the Italian Interior Minister, Roberto Maroni, visited Tripoli in February 2009. 173 Th e new strategy has led to a reduction in arrivals from Libya, which fell by 90% between May-August 2008 (over 15,000) and May-August 2009 (1,400). 174 Th e strategy has been criticised for the lack of investigation of possible claims to protection -or even the nationalities -of those returned to Libya, particularly given the absence of an asylum mechanism in Libya. 1   2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30   31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41 Spain has also addressed recent migration by sea through co-operation in control with states of departure -a phenomenon examined in Paula García Andrade's contribution to this collection. Signifi cant levels of irregular migration across the Strait of Gibraltar had occurred in the 1990s, with a peak in 2001, when 14,405 migrants were detained having arrived by sea from Morocco. 176 Spain's response included an agreement in 2003 with Morocco which permitted joint patrols in Moroccan waters. Even still, many migrants have continued to be detected on this route, with only a gradual decline from the 9,788 detained in 2003 to 4,243 in 2008. 177 Spain has responded in a similar fashion to arrivals to the Canary Islands. 178 In the 1990s, there were a small number of arrivals there, mainly coming directly from the closest points on the African continent in Morocco and Moroccancontrolled Western Sahara. From 2000 onwards, the numbers started to increase, and generally involved sea journeys of several hundred miles from departure points further south. Legal factors have played a signifi cant role in the Italian and Spanish adoption of strategies of interdiction, rather than allowing migrants to arrive, and then processing them as irregular entrants. As elsewhere, these strategies have partly been about avoiding responsibility for asylum claims. Th is appears especially relevant in the case of Italy: it has been reported that 75% of arrivals in Lampedusa in 2008 made applications for asylum, and that around 50% of these were 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25   26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43 granted some form of protection. 181 In the case of Spain, by contrast, it appears that irregular migrants arriving by sea very often do not claim asylum: for example, only 1377 applications for refugee status were made in the Canary Islands between 2006 and 2008, which was only 2.6% of the number of arrivals there over the same period. 182 For the Italian and Spanish authorities, domestic legal limits to detention for the purposes of identifi cation and expulsion are a further reason for interdiction strategies. In Italy, a change in the law in 2002 increased the maximum period that an irregular migrant could be detained from 30 days to 60 days, after which they had to be released and ordered to leave the territory. 183 Spain has a similar system, with a maximum period of detention is 40 days. 184 At the time of writing, both countries have recently taken steps to increase these limits. In Italy, the maximum detention period was increased to 180 days by legislation adopted in July 2009. 185 Meanwhile, in Spain, a government bill is before parliament which would increase the maximum detention period to 60 days. 186 A fi nal point with respect to Italian and Spanish interdictions concerns Frontex (the European border agency), which is analysed in detail in the chapter by Anneliese Baldaccini in this volume. Frontex has been involved in the delivery of Spanish-led interdiction operations off North and West Africa. 187 It also runs operation NAUTILUS from Malta, which may be thought to make Italian interdiction more likely by identifying or defl ecting migrants' vessels -even if Frontex claims no direct involvement in Italy's "diversion activities". 188 Indeed, prior to Italy's agreements with Libya, Frontex had itself sought to negotiate a joint arrangement to enable interdiction. 189 While interdiction is ultimately a national 
Conclusion: Restoring legal guarantees?
Th e proliferation of extraterritorial immigration control practices, partic ularly over the past two decades, can partly be explained by reference to factors other than legal guarantees. We have seen in this chapter that in many circumstancessuch as preclearance operations, or visas -the advantages to travellers can be a reason for such controls, because their journeys are not held up on arrival, or because they gain access a broader range of destinations. Developments in digital technology -including biometrics -are also relevant, in that they permit disparate immigration decision-makers to communicate with central authorities, and to check databases, in the home state. It is also clear that extraterritorial control leads to a legal regime which is favourable to intended destination states. By intervening before arrival, a destination state will hope to avoid the legal and logistical problems associated with returning someone to their state of nationality or departure. Specifi cally, return may be diffi cult to eff ect unless the individual's nationality and/ or travel route can be identifi ed, and unless there are arrangements for readmission with the state in question. 190 In addition, this chapter has shown how strategies of extraterritorial control enable destination states to free themselves from legal guarantees otherwise available to migrants. Th ese strategies generally set out to avoid international law obligations concerning non-refoulement. Th ey also typically seek to avoid domestic legal guarantees, such as rights of appeal and restrictions on detention, which are either freestanding, or which implement the principle of non-refoulement. Some combination of all these elements -avoidance of problems with return, non-refoulement obligations and domestic guarantees -has played a role in almost every initiative taken since the mid-1980s: the expansion of visa requirements, the introduction of carriers' obligations, the introduction of juxtaposed controls for travel to the United Kingdom, and strategies of interdiction at sea by the United States, Australia, Italy and Spain.
If we assume that forms of extraterritorial immigration control are likely to continue, is there a normative basis for the restoration of lost legal guarantees to those who face extraterritorial action? One concrete question concerns the legal position of persons refused a visa or permission to travel, or who are prevented from embarking. In normative terms, it is clear that any substantive rights of such persons -particularly those deriving from fundamental rights provisions or from national immigration law -ought to remain applicable in extraterritorial decision-making. Otherwise, the state will have escaped its legal obligations to individuals by the device of changing the location of decision-making. In addition, respect for the rule of law in these cases requires that eff ective legal procedures be available against negative decisions.
191 Th at this is not a utopian suggestion is shown by the provision made for appeals within the European Union's Visa Code, discussed above. Indeed, the very technological developments which support remote decision-making also strengthen the practical possibility to provide legal advice and legal procedures to those refused immigration permission extraterritorially.
A second concrete question concerns the applicability of the principle of nonrefoulement where control takes place extraterritorially. A number of developed states -including the United States, the United Kingdom and Italy -deny that duties of international protection have any extraterritorial reach.
192 Th e legal response to these developments has been to insist that international law guarantees of non-refoulement do apply extraterritorially. Th e reasoning in Sale has been criticised -including by den Heijer in this volume -on the grounds that Article 33 refers to return/refoulement "in any manner whatsoever", and that it should be interpreted in light of its humanitarian purpose. 193 A parallel argument has been developed with respect to human rights instruments -in particular, Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights -that a state's jurisdiction and responsibility arise from eff ective control over an individual or place, rather than from territory. 194 Writing in this volume, Anja Klug and Tim Howe bring these lines of analysis together, through the application of the expansive test of 1   2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34   35  36  37 195 For a discussion of the implications of a causation requirement for extraterritorial decisionmaking, see generally Gregor Noll "Seeking Asylum responsibility in international human rights law to the interpretation of Article 33 of the Geneva Convention. It is clear that the rejection of any responsibility by states acting extraterritorially is normatively unsustainable. Th is is for the obvious reason that that position would give states an incentive to manufacture a vacuum in international protection. In other words, they would be free to create a situation in which an individual in principle qualifi ed for international protection, but no state was responsible for its provision.
Th e opposite proposition -the application of the non-refoulement principle to all extraterritorial immigration action -may however also be too broad. One situation in which this proposition ought to be qualifi ed is where there is a 'territorial' state which could itself off er an acceptable level of protection. Th e logic of non-refoulement does not require a state acting extraterritorially to protect individuals on the territory of another state, where that state could itself do so. In particular, in such circumstances there may not be a causal link between the actions of the destination state and the possible refoulement.
195 It may therefore be best to treat extraterritorial responsibility for non-refoulement as the default position, applicable only where there is no territorial state which can itself off er eff ective protection.
Secondly, the extension of responsibility for non-refouelement to every extraterritorial action posed diffi culties in the context of irregular migration by sea. If all extraterritorial action by states gives rise to legal responsibility, states will have an incentive not to engage in safety-oriented surveillance, or in rescue operationsparticularly where several states are potentially responsible for surveillance and rescue. Alternatively -to the extent that safety-oriented surveillance and rescue remain eff ective -migrants will have an incentive to engage in risky journeys, in the hope of benefi ting from non-refoulement after rescue. A comprehensive humanitarian solution to the dilemmas posed by irregular migration by sea must include both respect for non-refoulement, and also respect for the safety of human life. Here too, it may be preferable to treat extraterritorial responsibility as the default position, subject to context-specifi c arrangements, which respect nonrefoulement and provide for the sharing of protection and safety obligations among states.
